Permanent Income Exercise

Corrected 1:40PM 4/9. Formulas (1), (3) and (4) have been corrected to use discrete, rather than exponential discounting. Equation (5) has been corrected to make lagged, not current, Y appear on the right.

1. Consider an agent who values wealth not only for the consumption its income allows, but also directly – being rich provides utility even when consumption is not high because of the wealth. We model this with the following quadratic utility function.

$$E\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(C_t - \frac{1}{2}C_t^2 + \boldsymbol{q}\left(W_t - \frac{1}{2}W_t^2\right)\right)\boldsymbol{b}^t\right]$$
 (1)

The constraint is as usual

$$W_{t} = (1+r)(W_{t-1} - C_{t-1}) + Y_{t} . (2)$$

We assume Y is i.i.d. with mean \overline{Y} . The interest rate r is constant. The solution is constrained to have

$$E[\mathbf{b}^{t/2}W_t] \to 0 \text{ as } t \to \infty .$$
 (3)

Assume $(1+r)\mathbf{b}=1$ and find the value function and the policy function. Is consumption a random walk? Discuss the difference between this solution and that for $\mathbf{q}=0$ that we discussed in class. If we replace (3) with a requirement that $W_t \ge 0$, all t, can we still argue as in class that the solution under (3) cannot be a solution with the $W_t \ge 0$ condition? (A complete answer to this last question is probably hard, and depends on material that should presented Monday 4/14 in class.)

2. Consider the standard permanent income problem, now with serially correlated income. The objective function is

$$E\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left(C_t - \frac{1}{2}C_t^2\right) \boldsymbol{b}^t\right] \tag{4}$$

and the constraint is still(2) and (3). But now instead of i.i.d.Y, we have

$$Y_{t} = \boldsymbol{a} \cdot (Y_{t-1} - \overline{Y}) + (1 - \boldsymbol{a})\overline{Y} + \boldsymbol{e}_{t}$$

$$\tag{5}$$

where e is i.i.d. with zero mean. Find the value function and the optimal policy rule. Note that we are not here assuming (1+r)b = 1.