ABSTRACT. When the interest rate on government debt is low enough, it becomes possible to roll it over indefinitely, never taxing to retire it, without producing a growing debt to GDP ratio. This has been called a situation with zero “fiscal cost” to debt. But when low interest on debt arises from its providing liquidity services, zero fiscal cost is equivalent to finance through seigniorage. The argument of Milton Friedman’s optimal quantity of money suggests that it is optimal to make no use of finance through seigniorage. In a simple perfect foresight equilibrium model with a distorting labor tax and a liquidity premium on government debt, we consider whether, and how much, use of seigniorage is optimal. In the optimal steady state, there is some use of seigniorage, but it is quantitively very small unless government spending absorbs a large fraction of output. But a credible, optimizing government that discounts the future at the same rate as private agents makes heavy use of seigniorage at first, while announcing future labor tax rates that grow over time and future inflation that converges to zero.

In recent articles Blanchard (2019) and Mehrotra and Sergeyev (2019) have reminded us that real rates of return on government debt have in most years been so low that the debt-to-GDP ratio would decline or remain stable even if the debt were simply rolled over. That is, without any taxation to “back” the debt, with interest and principal payments being financed entirely by the issue of new debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio would not increase. They characterize this situation as one in which there is zero or negative “fiscal cost” to public debt.

Conventional thinking about public debt sees debt as requiring fiscal backing, so that increased debt requires increased future taxes. If the taxes are distorting, this is a burden. But if debt has zero or negative “fiscal cost”, this conventional argument seems to fail. Indeed, it seems to lead to the conclusion that unless we expand the public debt, we are imposing an unnecessary welfare-reducing fiscal burden. Of course issuing more public debt might eventually force up interest rates, but until the “fiscal cost” is driven to zero, additional debt is providing a service people are apparently willing to pay for. Optimal fiscal policy then should, apparently, expand the debt until fiscal costs are driven to zero.
There is something to this argument, but it is essentially the same as the argument Milton Friedman made for an “optimal quantity of money”, which he said would be reached when the nominal interest rate was driven to zero. This is sometimes called the “Friedman rule”. In this paper we lay out the connection of the “fiscal cost” arguments to the Friedman rule and also explain limitations to the results in some papers in the literature that have claimed that the Friedman rule is optimal even when only distorting taxes are available.

Seigniorage is a source of revenue and inflation is a kind of tax. If an array of distorting taxes is available, generally making some use of each of them is optimal, as lower tax rates are less distorting. It seems then likely that when only distorting taxes are available, it is optimal to make at least some use of the inflation tax, so that other tax rates can be lower.

Woodford (1990) shows that, with distorting taxes, the utility-maximizing steady state of an economy with liquidity-providing money may involve positive seigniorage. Calvo (1978) showed in a model with money and distorting taxes that an optimizing government that can credibly commit to future policies creates high inflation initially and converges to a steady state with positive seigniorage, even though a steady state satisfying the Friedman rule is feasible.

Chari and Kehoe (1999) proved that in an apparently quite general setting, it is optimal not to use the inflation tax, even when the only other taxes available are distorting.¹ That is, when money pays no interest, the nominal interest rate on other assets should be zero, or if money pays interest, the rate on it should match that on other assets. Their model has real balances and consumption entering utility homothetically — that is, with the relative marginal utilities of real balances and consumption depending only on their ratio. They point out that their result hinges on this homotheticity assumption. The assumption seems reasonable, at least as an approximation, and neither the Woodford paper nor the Calvo paper imposed homotheticity. It might appear, therefore, that Woodford and Calvo’s optimal equilibria with positive seigniorage would have disappeared if only their models had restricted real balances and consumption to enter the objective function homothetically. This paper’s model shows that this is not true.

The Chari/Kehoe result depends on an assumption, which they make explicit but do not emphasize, that the government can at an initial date inject money into the economy by purchasing bonds from the private sector. Under the commonly invoked assumption that government interest-bearing debt must remain non-negative, or at least bounded below, the Chari/Kehoe result does not hold. If the government can own capital with a rate of return higher than that on government liabilities, it can

¹Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996) showed this result earlier, in a paper that assumed cash-in-advance transactions technology. The later paper by Chari and Kehoe extended the result to other transactions technologies, including that in this paper.
provide a high return on its debt without taxing. The Calvo and Woodford models, like this paper’s model, assume non-negative government liabilities; it is this property of these models that implies positive seigniorage in steady state and a possibility of increasing welfare by postponing taxation.

To see this point, we set out a simple model in which real balances enter the objective function homothetically, but the government can borrow, but not lend. In this model it is easy to prove analytically Woodford’s result that an optimal steady state uses the inflation tax. In this model we can prove that such a steady state exists and is the unique equilibrium when the tax rate is held constant. Calvo’s result that an optimizing, benevolent planner chooses initial low taxes and high seigniorage also holds in this model.

To emphasize the connection to current policy discussions, we focus on a version of the model in which all government liabilities pay interest and provide liquidity services, without distinguishing non-interest-bearing “money” from non-liquidity-providing “debt”.

We first consider steady states in the model and discuss how unanticipated shifts in demand for debt’s liquidity services or in the level of government purchases affect the price level and the optimal amount of seigniorage revenue. Apparently realistic values of the model’s parameters imply that little revenue is raised via seigniorage in an optimal steady state. Shifts in the demand for liquidity, in this flex-price model, can produce jumps in the price level unless fiscal policy takes drastic countermeasures.

The model’s optimal steady state would be the choice of a constrained planner, announcing current and future tax rate policy credibly at an initial date, only if the planner did not discount the future (even though the representative agent in the model does discount). The possibility of lowering distorting taxes today, while promising increased taxes in the future, creates an intertemporal tradeoff for the optimizing policy maker. In fact if the policy maker discounts future agent utility at the same rate as the representative agent, the optimal policy has the tax rate very low initially and rising over time toward a tax rate of 100%. Welfare when the tax rate is near 1.0 is extremely low, but the optimal path approaches this limit extremely slowly, over centuries, so that gains in welfare over an initial few decades more than offset the discounted losses far in the future.

If debt provides no liquidity services, so its rate of return reflects the relative marginal utilities of consumption at different dates, this model behaves like most simple perfect foresight models of debt and distorting taxes: Optimal policy then is to inflate away all debt at time zero or, if the initial real value of debt is a constraint, keeping the tax rate constant at a level that keeps real debt constant. There is no possibility of increasing welfare by lowering taxes now and raising them later, because the required taxes later grow at the real interest rate. But in a model like this one, where
the return on debt includes a liquidity premium, the postponed losses from higher future tax distortions grow slower than the real rate of intertemporal substitution. This creates the possibility of increasing discounted utility by postponing taxation.

I. Simple Model

A representative individual chooses the time paths of $C$ (consumption), $L$ (labor), $B$ (nominal government debt) and $M$ (non-interest-bearing money) while taking $P$ (the price level) and $\tau$ (the tax rate on labor) paths as given (and known in advance). The individual’s objective is to maximize

$$\int_0^\infty e^{-\beta t}(\log C_t - L_t) \, dt$$ (1)

subject to

$$C \cdot (1 + \gamma v) + \frac{\dot{B} + \dot{M}}{P} = (1 - \tau) L + \frac{rB}{P}$$ (2)

$$v = \frac{PC}{M}.$$ (3)

Here $v$ is a version of “velocity”, and $\gamma v/(1 + \gamma v)$ can be interpreted as the fraction of consumption spending that is absorbed by transactions costs. An equivalent specification would define

$$C^* = C \cdot (1 + \gamma v)$$

and then make utility depend on

$$\log \left( \left( \sqrt{1 + \frac{4\gamma C^*}{m}} - 1 \right) \cdot \frac{m}{2\gamma} \right),$$

where $m = M/P$ is real balances, rather than on $\log C$. The money-in-budget-constraint formulation makes it easier to see what fraction of spending is absorbed by transactions costs, and in particular avoids allowing implied transactions costs becoming negative. The money-in-utility version makes utility homothetic in $m$ and $C^*$, as Chari and Kehoe assume.

The linear disutility of labor and unbounded supply of labor are chosen to make the algebra of deriving our results simpler. As should become clear, the results don’t depend on these details of the specification.

The private agent’s problem leads to first order conditions

$$C \cdot (1 + 2\gamma v) = 1 - \tau$$ (4)

$$\frac{-\tau}{1 - \tau} = \gamma v^2 - \beta - \frac{p}{P}.$$ (5)

$$r = \gamma v^2$$ (6)
The government has to finance a given path $G$ of expenditures, which provide no utility to the private agents. Its budget constraint is

$$\frac{\dot{B} + \dot{M}}{P} + \tau L = G + \frac{rB}{P}. \quad (7)$$

The social resource constraint

$$C \cdot (1 + \gamma v) + G = L \quad (8)$$

is derivable from the government and private budget constraints.

Suppose policy fixes constant values for $r$ and $\tau$, from $t = 0$ onwards. From (6) we see that this also fixes a constant value for $v$. Then the private labor-consumption tradeoff equation (4) and the social resource constraint (8) provide two equations in the two unknowns $C$ and $L$. If the policy is feasible, therefore, $C$ and $L$ will be constant. The private sector’s Euler equation (5) then becomes $r = \beta + \dot{P}/P$ and implies that inflation is constant. Since real balances $m = M/P$ are just $C/v$, they also are constant.

Substituting these relations into the government budget constraint (7) allows us to arrive at

$$\dot{b} = G - \tau L - m \frac{\dot{P}}{P} + \beta b, \quad (9)$$

where $b = B/P$ is real debt. Everything on the right of (9) except $b$, we already know to be constant. With $\beta > 0$, this is an unstable differential equation in which all solutions but one grow in absolute value at the rate $\beta$. Assuming that both $B$ and $M$ must be non-negative, the private sector’s transversality condition is

$$e^{-\beta t} \frac{b_t + m}{C \cdot (1 + 2\gamma v)} \xrightarrow{t \to \infty} 0, \quad (10)$$

where the time subscripts have been omitted on variables we know must be constant. Obviously (10) implies $b$ cannot explode at the rate $\beta$, so there is only one solution to (9) consistent with private sector optimization, that with $b$ constant at

$$b = \frac{\tau L + m \frac{\dot{P}}{P} - G}{\beta}. \quad (11)$$

That is, real interest-bearing debt is the excess of tax revenues and seigniorage over government expenditure, discounted to the present at the rate $\beta$. Because the government budget constraint implies a continuous time path for $B + M$, and $b + m$ is determined by the equilibrium conditions, the initial price level is uniquely determined.

If (11) delivers a negative value for $b$, the $\tau, r$ policy choice is not feasible — there is not enough tax revenue and seigniorage to cover $G$. Assuming no constraints on the ability of the policy authority to impose a surprise jump inflation or deflation at time 0, it is optimal to choose an $r, \tau$ pair that makes $b = 0$. With $b > 0$, fiscal effort must be greater, either through seigniorage or taxation, and this is welfare-reducing.
There is a menu of choices of $r, \tau$ pairs that deliver $b = 0$, and welfare differs along this menu. It is clear from (11), though, that setting $r = 0$ and thus $m = \infty$ is not feasible, much less optimal, since this would require the seigniorage term $m\dot{P}/P \leq -\infty$ and $\tau L$ can be shown to be bounded above.

Where does this model deviate from the assumptions that allow Chari and Kehoe to derive their result? They observe that this model, in which the policy-maker is assumed to fully commit to future policies, has the property that it is optimal for the government to default on any outstanding net debt at the initial date, while issuing new liabilities on which it promises believably that it will never default. A policy recommendation like this is obviously unrealistic, so in models like this it is usual to constrain what the government can do at the initial date. Chari and Kehoe assume the government has zero net worth at $t = 0$, as would be true if it initially defaulted on outstanding debt and initially there was no money. They assume that to get money into the hands of the public at $t = 0$, the government undertakes “open market operations”, buying from the private sector non-money nominal assets (bonds, or loans to the public from the government). In other words, they assume that government interest-bearing debt can be negative, and arbitrarily large in absolute value. At the initial date, their assumptions imply government has exactly matched nominal assets and nominal liabilities, with $M$ being the liabilities, $B = -M$.

By promising to shrink $M$ (and $B$) at the rate $-\beta$, the government can then guarantee a nominal interest rate of zero. It can shrink the stock of money entirely by open market operations, selling its loans or bonds back to the public at the rate $-\beta$. This keeps assets and liabilities perfectly aligned, and no taxes are ever required to maintain the $M$ shrinkage rate.

II. WHAT ARE REASONABLE ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INITIAL CONDITIONS?

The government budget constraint (7) implies that total government liabilities, $B + M$ has a continuous time path. In other words, to change $B + M$ requires changing tax revenues $\tau L$, government expenditures $G$, or interest payments on debt $rB$. It is unreasonable to think of any of these as being changeable at infinite rates. Treating the rate of growth $\dot{B} + \dot{M}$ as well defined at every date, which is implied by treating (7) as a non-forward-looking equation, makes economic sense.

The government budget constraint does not require that $B$ and $M$ individually have continuous time paths. With $B_{-0}$ and $B_{+0}$ (for example) as notation for the left and right limits of $B$ at time zero, we have

$$B_{-0} + M_{-0} = B_{+0} + M_{+0},$$

while $B_{-0} \neq B_{+0}$ and $M_{-0} \neq M_{-0}$ are possible. But then if $B_{-0} + M_{-0}$ is non-zero, to arrive at zero net worth at time zero requires a policy that makes $P_{+0}$ infinite. If
$B$ is bounded below, this implies in turn real balances $m_{+0} = M_{+0}/P_{+0}$ are zero and that transactions costs absorb all of output.

While setting interest bearing debt to zero (or its minimum feasible value) is beneficial, in the model money balances are important. An optimizing government, free to choose a time path of policy that fixes the price level at time zero, will choose a combination of interest rate and tax policies that make $M_{+0} = B_{-0} + M_{-0}$ and thus $B_{+0} = 0$.

Another way to explain our initial date assumption is that we assume the government issuing nominal debt is recognized to have the option at any date of diluting the claims of holders of the debt and of money balances by deficit finance, but is assumed to be committed not to introduce a new currency, and debt denominated in it, that has a higher seniority as a claim on future revenues.

Of course if the government at time zero can repudiate both existing debt and existing currency, then issue new currency and use it to buy private sector liabilities, and if it can do all this while preserving its perfect credibility, it can achieve a better outcome than is obtainable by just setting the $P_{+0}$ so that agents choose $B_{+0} = 0$. However defaulting on outstanding debt and currency is an action that the government is assumed never to do in the future. On the other hand using unanticipated price level fluctuations to stabilize the real value $b + m$, and maintaining $b = 0$, is not only optimal at time zero, in a stochastic version of the model the fully committed government does this at every date.

In mapping the conclusions of this model into an actual economy, the optimality of $b = 0$ should not be taken as implying that interest-bearing debt does not or should not exist. In reality government debt comes in many maturities, all or most of which pay real returns lower than what is apparently available on other investments. What we have called $M$ in the model could pay interest without any change in the model's logic or implications. In this light, the $b = 0$ conclusion is a conclusion that government debt that exists should pay an interest rate less than or equal to what is available on other investments, with equality only when demand for liquidity has been saturated.

III. Numerical example

In this section we solve numerically for optimal equilibrium with a given constant $G$. Based on the argument of the previous section, we assume all government debt provides transactions services, and switch notation to call this service-providing debt $B$. We assume the optimizing government sets $\tau$ and $i$, the nominal interest rate on $B$, with the objective of maximizing the equilibrium value of the private agent’s
objective function (1). The government takes (4), (5), (7) and (8) as constraints. Equation (6) is replaced by
\[ i = \beta + \frac{\dot{p}}{p} - \gamma v^2 - \frac{\dot{\tau}}{1 - \tau}. \]  
(13)

We define
\[ \rho = i - \frac{p}{P}, \]  
(14)
which is the real rate of return on government debt.

We can rewrite the system with \( \rho \) replacing \( i \), and, because \( i \) and \( \dot{p}/p \) enter the system only as their difference, we then have a system of 5 equations in 5 unknowns, which we assemble here for convenience:

\[
\begin{align*}
C \cdot (1 + 2\gamma v) &= 1 - \tau \\
\dot{b} &= \rho b + G - \tau L. \\
C(1 + \gamma v) + G &= L \\
\rho &= \beta - \gamma v^2 - \frac{\dot{\tau}}{1 - \tau} \\
v &= \frac{c}{b}.
\end{align*}
\]  
(4), (7), (8), (15), (16)

Note that by using \( \rho \), we have eliminated both \( i \) and \( \dot{p}/p \) from the system. This implies that given the time path of \( \tau \), \( i \) affects the equilibrium only by changing the inflation rate. Changing \( i \) has no effect on the other five variables: \( C, v, \rho, L, \) and \( b \). Also, though \( \dot{\tau} \) appears in the system, it of course drops out when policy fixes a constant \( \tau \), so that equilibrium is defined by 5 ordinary equations in 5 unknowns.

As we will see below, if the optimizing government discounts future utility at the same rate as the representative agent, keeping \( \tau \) constant is not optimal. We are in this section finding equilibrium with constant \( \tau \), and optimizing the constant \( \tau \), which is optimal only for a government that does not discount future utility, even though the representative agent does so. An argument in the appendix shows that transversality and feasibility guarantee that when \( \tau \) is constant, \( b \) must also be constant.

Because \( b \) can (via a jump in initial price level \( P_0 \)) jump at the initial date, there is no transition path from equilibrium with one level of constant \( \tau \) to another if a one-time, permanent, unanticipated change in \( \tau \) occurs. In this flex-price model, the economy goes immediately to the new equilibrium. The same is true if there is a one-time, unanticipated shift in a parameter, like the transactions cost or liquidity service parameter \( \gamma \), so long as \( \tau \) is constant.

The equation system for the constant-\( \tau \) case can be solved analytically, resulting in a univariate quadratic equation. With \( \gamma = \tau = G = 0 \), the agent chooses \( L = C = 1 \). Existence of constant-\( \tau \) equilibrium requires \( \tau > 2G - 1 \). In that case, there is a
unique steady state for every feasible $\tau$, and there are no non-steady-state equilibrium paths, so the initial price level is uniquely determined. Note that $\tau < 1$, because otherwise it is optimal to set $L = 0$, and that therefore constant-$\tau$ steady states require $G < 1$.

In the tables below $\tau$ is the optimal constant $\tau$ for the table’s assumed value of $G$. It was found by a one-dimensional grid search on $\tau$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>$C$</th>
<th>$b/y$</th>
<th>$L$</th>
<th>$\dot{P}/P$</th>
<th>$U$</th>
<th>$\tau$</th>
<th>$\sigma$</th>
<th>$\frac{\gamma v}{1+\gamma v}$</th>
<th>$P_0$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.0069</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.0037</td>
<td>0.0026</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.0076</td>
<td>-1.30</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-0.0103</td>
<td>0.0086</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.0107</td>
<td>-1.34</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.0234</td>
<td>0.0296</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.0137</td>
<td>-1.46</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>-0.0295</td>
<td>0.1047</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1.** Optimal steady state with $G = 0$, $\beta = 0.02$, $i = 0.02$

$\gamma$: transactions cost parameter; $C$: consumption; $b/y$: debt/output; $L$: labor; $\dot{P}/P$: inflation rate; $U$: utility; $\tau$: labor tax rate; $\sigma$: seigniorage revenue; $\gamma v/(1+\gamma v)$: proportion of consumption expenditure absorbed by transaction costs; $P_0$: initial price level, assuming $B_0 = 1$; $G$: non-productive government expenditure; $\beta$: discount rate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>$C$</th>
<th>$b/y$</th>
<th>$L$</th>
<th>$\dot{P}/P$</th>
<th>$U$</th>
<th>$\tau$</th>
<th>$\sigma$</th>
<th>$\frac{\gamma v}{1+\gamma v}$</th>
<th>$P_0$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.0823</td>
<td>-2.63</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.0090</td>
<td>46.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.0855</td>
<td>-2.66</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>0.0284</td>
<td>15.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.0955</td>
<td>-2.78</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.0129</td>
<td>0.0890</td>
<td>5.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.1137</td>
<td>-3.06</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.0342</td>
<td>0.2522</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.** Optimal steady state with $G = 0.25$, $\beta = 0.02$, $i = 0.02$

See notes to Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\gamma$</th>
<th>$C$</th>
<th>$b/y$</th>
<th>$L$</th>
<th>$\dot{P}/P$</th>
<th>$U$</th>
<th>$\tau$</th>
<th>$\sigma$</th>
<th>$\frac{\gamma v}{1+\gamma v}$</th>
<th>$P_0$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.0823</td>
<td>-2.63</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
<td>0.0090</td>
<td>46.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.0855</td>
<td>-2.66</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.0042</td>
<td>0.0284</td>
<td>15.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.0955</td>
<td>-2.78</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.0129</td>
<td>0.0890</td>
<td>5.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.1137</td>
<td>-3.06</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.0342</td>
<td>0.2522</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.** Optimal steady state with $G = 0.8$, $\beta = 0.02$, $i = 0.02$

See notes to Table 1

Tables 1, 2, and 3 show the model’s optimal steady state at various levels of government spending $G$ and transactions cost parameter $\gamma$. Even in Table 1, where there is no government spending to finance, it is optimal to have a positive rate of labor
tax \( \tau \), in order to induce low inflation, a positive real return \( \rho \) on government debt, and hence a reduced incentive to conserve on real balances. However even in this case the inflation rate does not go to zero, as would be required to make \( \rho = .02 \) and thereby implement the Friedman rule. The most realistic of these cases, might be Table 2’s \( \gamma = .01 \) row. This produces a “debt to GDP” ratio of about 0.8, transactions costs absorbing about 1% of consumption and a tax rate of 27%. In this case the optimal real rate on debt \( \rho \) (the 2% nominal rate \( i \) minus the inflation rate) is 1.24%.

If government expenditure becomes large enough, it becomes optimal to make seigniorage positive, as we see in Table 3. In that table taxes and inflation substantially depress consumption in order to accommodate the high level of \( G \). Inflation is over 8%, implying sharply negative real rates of return on government debt. Nonetheless seigniorage delivers only a small fraction of total revenue.

With \( \tau = 0 \), seigniorage is increasing in \( v \) over the whole \((0, \infty)\) range, and approaches .5 from below as \( v \to \infty \). Even in Table 3, where government expenditure is taking up around 80% of output and the tax rate is about 80%, seigniorage remains well below its upper bound. Even though the Friedman rule is not optimal in this model, the inflation tax produces little revenue relative to the distortion it induces, so that it is optimal to use it to generate revenue only when the other tax available is at highly distortionary levels.

**IV. ALLOWING FOR GROWTH**

The arithmetic of “zero fiscal cost” debt seems to rest on there being positive growth. The idea is that if the economy is growing at a rate exceeding the real rate of return on government debt, debt can be increased today, without any actual or expected future increases in taxiation (or reductions in expenditure). with debt nonetheless shrinking relative to output over time.

This line of reasoning is misleading. It ignores wealth effects and inflation. People must be induced to hold the additional debt. They can be induced to do so, even without increased taxation, but only by lowering its real value through inflation. This is true whether or not there is economic growth.

In fact, in this paper’s model if we introduce constant labor augmenting technical progress at the rate \( \theta \) and interpret \( C, G \) and \( \sigma \) as ratios to \( e^{\theta t} \), the model is unchanged except that the discount rate now has to be interpreted as the discount rate \( \beta \) of private agents plus the rate of technical progress \( \theta \). None of the table entries then change. The “\( \beta = .02 \)” line in the captions would change to \( \beta + \theta = .02 \).

Of course, tables calculated with private agents’ \( \beta = .02, \theta = .02 \), would differ from those shown. But the difference would not be lower labor taxes at a given \( G \). Because the Friedman rule requires a higher return on \( B \) with an increase from \( \beta \) to \( \beta + \theta \) in the discount rate, the optimal tax rate emerges as higher, not lower, with increases in \( \theta \).
V. Effects of a Jump in Liquidity Demand or in the Tax Rate

Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) present evidence that US Treasury securities have historically paid a lower yield than comparable corporate bonds, that this cannot be explained by default risk, and that the yield spread shrinks as the supply of treasury securities increases. They argue that Treasuries behave much like non-interest-bearing high-powered money in these respects. Our simple model can be regarded as a stylized equilibrium model built on their observations.

Under what conditions in this model is it welfare-improving to increase reliance on unbacked deficit finance? Since the model implies a tradeoff of one kind of finance (seigniorage) against another (labor taxation), both of which are distorting, the answer to this question must depend on both the rate of labor taxation and the “fiscal cost” (i.e. seigniorage). Increased unbacked deficits will generate revenue and allow reduction of labor taxes, or increased $G$ with no increase in labor taxes. But this is not always welfare-improving. In our simple, casually calibrated, model, in the $G = .25$, $\gamma = .01$ case, it is optimal to expand seigniorage to reduce labor taxes only when seigniorage is excessively negative. With seigniorage positive welfare can be improved by reducing inflation and seigniorage, while increasing labor taxes.

The model, as we have noted, goes to its steady state immediately when $G$ and $\tau$ are fixed. We can see the consequences of going from the optimal steady state with $G = .2$ to the optimal steady state with $G = .25$ by comparing lines 1 and 2 of Table 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$G$</th>
<th>$\tau$</th>
<th>$C$</th>
<th>$b/y$</th>
<th>$L$</th>
<th>$P^0/P$</th>
<th>$U$</th>
<th>$\sigma$</th>
<th>$\frac{\gamma^\nu}{1+\gamma^\nu}$</th>
<th>$P^0$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.0059</td>
<td>-1.238</td>
<td>-0.0142</td>
<td>0.0076</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>0.0076</td>
<td>-1.304</td>
<td>-0.0103</td>
<td>0.0086</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.0008</td>
<td>-1.247</td>
<td>-0.0481</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>0.2281</td>
<td>-1.336</td>
<td>0.0310</td>
<td>0.0456</td>
<td>6.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.** Optimal and suboptimal financing of $G$

See notes to Table 1 for variable definitions. Lines 1 and 2 show solutions with optimal tax rates for the given $G$ values. Lines 3 and 4 are solutions for given $G$ and $\tau$, with no optimization. Comparing lines 1 and 4 shows the change in going from $G = .20$ with optimal $\tau$ to $G = .25$ with unchanged $\tau$. Comparing lines 2 and 3 shows the reverse case.

The table shows that it is optimal to have negative seigniorage in both cases, with the change in $G$ almost entirely covered by a change in $\tau$. The effects on $C$, $L$ and utility $U$ are minor. However the effects on $b/y$ and $P^0$ are substantial. Optimal policy requires reducing $b/y$ by nearly 20 per cent, and accomplishing this mainly through a jump in the price level of over 20 per cent. Within the model, this jump in the price level is costless, but in reality it would be costly. That it would be costly...
does not necessarily imply that in a model recognizing price stickiness a rapid temporary inflation would not be part of an optimal solution. Avoiding the jump would require credibly announcing a decreasing time path for the tax rate.

Comparing lines 1 and 4 shows that increasing $G$ without any adjustment in $\tau$ would greatly increase both the initial jump in prices and the resulting steady state inflation rate. Thus it is possible to increase $G$ and finance the increase entirely without change in tax rates, but only at the cost of high inflation.

We can do a similar exercise comparing lines 1 and 2 or lines 2 and 3 of Table 2. This lets us see the optimal policy response to a sudden increase in the demand for $B$. Going either from line 1 to 2 or from line 2 to 3, we see that the values of steady state $C$, $L$, $\tau$, and $U$ are little changed by the rise in demand for government liquid assets. But $P_0$ and $b/y$ are drastically affected. The optimal response to the rise in liquidity produces a downward jump in $P_0$ by a factor of roughly 3. Unlike an upward jump in $P_0$, it seems possible that the jump could be eliminated by a feasible fiscal intervention. What would be required is a sudden expansion of $B_0$ at the initial date, in proportion to the drop in $P_0$ that would be required without any change in $B_0$. This could be accomplished by a “helicopter drop” — lump sum transfers of government paper to the public.

It is tempting to take this case of response to a rise in demand for liquidity as roughly corresponding to the policy problems of the US (and other countries) in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis. In this interpretation, the rise in outstanding real debt was required to avoid rapid deflation. With debt expansion arising from this source, the lack of any rise in inflation or interest rates is not surprising.

The expansion is not in itself a reason for greatly increased fiscal stringency. Just as before the increase in real debt, the desirability of unbacked debt finance, i.e. of increased reliance on seigniorage, depends on comparing the distortion from constricting the supply of liquidity services from government debt to the reduced distortion from direct taxation, or the benefits from productive government expenditures, that would be allowed by increasing reliance on seigniorage. So long as inflation, interest rates on government debt, and tax rates remain as they were before the debt expansion, the optimal balance of seignorage vs. direct taxation is not much affected by the level of debt.

On the other hand, on this interpretation, the fact that interest rates and inflation have been stable in the face of the recent rise in debt cannot be taken as implying that debt financed fiscal expansion can be continued without limit without inflationary consequences.

VI. Optimal, time-inconsistent policy with full commitment

The equation system on page 8 can be solved to allow expressing all variables in the system as functions of $v$, $\tau$, and $\dot{\tau}$. Dividing the government budget constraint
by $b$ and expressing the left-hand side ($\dot{b}/b$) and $\rho$ as functions of $\tau$, $\dot{\tau}$ and $v$ produces

$$\frac{\dot{b}}{b} = -\frac{\rho}{1-\tau} - \frac{1 + 4\gamma v}{1 + 2\gamma v} = \beta - \gamma v^2 - \frac{\dot{\tau}}{1-\tau} + \frac{G - \tau L}{b}. \quad (17)$$

The terms in $\dot{\tau}$ cancel, allowing us to derive an expression for $\dot{v}/v$ in terms of $\tau$ and $v$ alone:

$$\frac{\dot{v}}{v} = S \cdot \frac{1}{1 + 2\gamma v} + R \cdot \frac{\gamma v^2(1 + \tau - 2G) + (\tau - G)v - \beta}{1 + 4\gamma v}, \quad (18)$$

where we have labeled the two expressions in the formula for $\dot{v}/v$ as $R$ and $S$ to facilitate subsequent derivations. Note that the locus of constant-$v$ points is defined by $R = 0$.

Equation (18) captures all the constraints on the government imposed by the social resource constraint and private agent choice behavior. An optimizing government with the same objective function as the private agent will therefore solve this problem:

$$\max_{\tau, v} \int_0^\infty e^{-\beta t} (\log C_t - L_t) \, dt \quad (19)$$

subject to (18), (4), and (8). \quad (20)

The first-order conditions for this problem lead, after using (4) and (8) to leave just $v$ and $\tau$ in the system, to two equations determining the optimal path. One involves no derivatives (because $\dot{\tau}$ does not appear in the constraints or the objective function):

$$\frac{1}{1-\tau} = \frac{1 + \gamma v}{1 + 2\gamma v} + (\gamma v^2 + v) \eta \cdot \frac{1 + 2\gamma v}{1 + 4\gamma v}, \quad (21)$$

The other is a messy expression determining $\eta$ as a function of $\eta$, $\tau$, and $v$. Computer code that builds up the expression from components is in the appendix. Equation (21) allows us to substitute $\tau$ out of both the $\dot{\eta}$ expression and the $\dot{v}$ expression (18), giving us a system of two ordinary differential equations in two unknowns, $v$ and $\eta$.

I have not been able to compute analytical solutions to the system, but the system is relatively simple to understand via numerical and graphical methods. One component of the analysis sets up a 100 by 100 point grid in $(\tau, v)$ space and calculates $\dot{\tau}, \dot{v}$ pairs at every point on that grid. The locus of (approximate) $\dot{v} = 0$ points on the grid is then the set of constant-$v$ points.\(^2\) This locus is entirely determined by (18) and, since it is not affected by $\dot{\tau}$, is also the locus of constant-$\tau$ steady-state solutions displayed in the tables above. The optimal steady state from the $\gamma = .01$ line of Table 2 is the blue triangle on the plot. The locus of $\dot{\tau} = 0$ points can also be plotted on the same panel, and any intersection of the two lines is a steady state of the planner’s problem.

\(^2\)This locus easily plotted using the R `contour()` function.
In Figure 1 the green line is the locus of constant-$\tau$ steady states and the black line, entirely above the green one, is the locus of points where the optimizing planner sets $\check{\tau}$ to zero. From the figure, it might seem that the two curves do not intersect at all, but this is an artifact of the finite resolution of the grid. Figure 4 zooms in on a thin sliver at the left edge of Figure 1 plot, still using a 100 by 100 grid, and it is clear that the two curves do intersect — at $\tau = 1$. (This can in fact be shown analytically.)

In Figure 1 the red arrows indicate the direction and magnitude of change in $(v, \tau)$ at each point, along a path satisfying the local first-order conditions (Euler equations) of the planner’s problem. The planner can choose the starting point of the economy’s path. By announcing the time paths of $\tau$ and deficits, the planner determines the initial price level and, thereby, both $v$ and $\tau$ at the initial date. With the initial state freely chosen, the optimum is determined by the initial transversality condition $\eta_0 = 0$, combined with restrictions on the path’s behavior as $t \to \infty$.

The red arrows on Figure 1 make it clear that when starting from points above the $\check{v} = 0$ line, these Euler equation paths imply rapid increase in $v$, with $\tau$ converging to the $\check{\tau} = 0$ line. In fact it can be shown that along such paths $v \to \infty$ in finite time. Since $v \to \infty$ implies $C \to 0$, paths like this have infinitely negative discounted utility and thus cannot be solutions — we know there are feasible constant-$\tau$ paths that deliver finite discounted utility. Paths that start well below the $\check{v} = 0$ line lead to steadily declining $v$, toward $v = 0$. These paths are ruled out by the private agents’ transversality condition: as $v \to 0$, an optimizing agent can eventually improve on such a path by consuming part of her stock of $b$. This raises future transactions costs, but only slightly if $v$ is close to zero, while consuming a given fraction of $b$ produces arbitrarily high utility as $b \to \infty$.

There is only one path (the “saddle path”) that satisfies the Euler equations while neither diverging toward $v = 0$ nor diverging to $v = \infty$. The start of such a path is shown as the orange line on Figure 1. It was calculated by imposing $\eta_0 = 0$ and varying $v_0^3$ to find a line that did not diverge either to the left or the right.\footnote{This method is called “multiple shooting”.} If we could calculate the full path, it would converge to $\tau = 1$, but beyond the part of it shown in orange, it would on the Figure 1 graph seem to coincide with the green line. They are so close, because in this range $\tau$ on the optimal path is increasing extremely slowly. The part of the optimal saddle path shown as the orange line is traversed over approximately 400 years. Though the economy proceeds, if the time-0 policy commitments are honored, toward $\tau = 1$, it does not get close to $\tau = 1$ for many centuries.

\footnote{Actually, \textit{every} path calculated diverged either to the left or the right. What is shown is just the longest path the differential equation solver could calculate before it diverged. Changes in the initial conditions in the fourth significant digit made the solution change from the path shown (which actually crosses the green line and shoots off to the right) to a path that parallels the green line for a while then shoots off to the left.}
FIGURE 1. Beginning of optimal path

Note: While the orange saddle path appears to hit the green constant-\( \nu \) locus, in fact it stays extremely close to it, but always below it, and the orange, green and black lines all meet at \( \tau = 1 \), never crossing before that point. The red arrows show the derivatives of the \( \nu, \tau \) vectors. The derivative vectors change rapidly in the neighborhood of the green \( \dot{\nu} = 0 \) line. In fact they parallel the green line at points just below it. The blue triangle is the optimal steady state, corresponding to the \( \gamma = .01 \) line of table 2.
Figure 2. 400 years along the saddle path
Note: v: velocity (C/b); eta: costate; tau: tax rate; C: consumption; U: utility; pi: inflation; b: real debt. In the optimal steady state, v=.85, C=.72, U=-1.30, pi=.0072, b=.81.

The time paths of several of the model’s variables are shown in Figure 2, for the first 400 years, and in Figure 3 for the first 10 years. Inflation is high at the start, taxes are very low, and utility is higher than in the steady-state optimum over the entire first 10 years.
In Calvo’s model with real balances entering separably in the utility function, it is optimal to set taxes to zero at time 0. In this model, with $\beta = .02$, $\gamma = .01$, it turns out that optimal $\tau_0 < 0$, i.e. a labor subsidy. The optimal path delivers considerably higher utility in the initial, low-tax periods, and utility approaching $-\infty$ in the far distant future. $\tau$ rises above the optimal undiscounted optimal steady state value, but not for a long time, and the rise of $\tau$ toward 1 is very slow. The near-term benefits
of low taxes more than offset the heavy, but long-delayed, costs of high taxes in the distant future.

To visualize the last part of the optimal path, Figure 4 zooms in on the sliver of Figure 1 at the left edge, for $v$ in $(0,1)$. There is no separate orange line, because it so
nearly coincides with the green $\dot{\tau} = 0$ line. Progress toward $\tau = 1$ in this region is extremely slow, and $\eta \to \infty$ in this region. That is, the benefit of violating the time-zero commitment to this path becomes very large. It is likely that the temptation for a policy maker to re-initialize by dropping taxes would be overwhelming. Note that this is different from the simple Phillips curve examples of time-inconsistency, where the benefits of abandoning commitment to no surprise inflation are constant over time after the first period.

VII. ARE THERE GENERALLY USEFUL INSIGHTS FROM THE FULL-COMMITMENT SOLUTION?

This model makes strong functional form assumptions that affect its conclusions, but it embodies principles that may apply more widely. Why is it optimal to inflate early and postpone taxation? The gap between the return on government debt and the discount rate $\beta$ means that when revenue collection is postponed, the ratio of required future revenue to the revenue initially postponed grows slower than $\beta$. Its discounted present value therefore shrinks the more it is postponed. The solution is not indefinite postponement, because as the required revenue grows, the costs of the distortion induced by taxation grow more than linearly with the revenue. High future seigniorage revenue, since it is anticipated, raises the current price level and thereby reduces the base for the current inflation tax, while high future taxes have the opposite effect on the base for the current inflation tax. These are general principles that are likely to apply in other models.

Calvo’s model produces a qualitatively similar result. Though his framework, unlike this paper’s, made satiation of demand for money possible in a steady state, he showed that with full commitment the economy has high initial inflation and converges to a steady state that preserves a gap between the return on money and the discount rate.

Since abandoning the full-commitment path eventually becomes extremely beneficial, it is unlikely that any government would actually follow the path for a long time. And if private agents know the commitment will be abandoned, the benefits of proposing it will shrink or disappear. Nonetheless, the tradeoffs the full-commitment path brings out are likely to affect policy discussion, especially in times of fiscal stress. The argument that a gap between the return on government debt and market interest rates is a fiscal resource that can be used to avoid high current levels of taxation is correct. That this will require increase fiscal effort in the future, but only a modest increase, and one that can be repeatedly postponed at modest cost, is also correct. The counterargument is that these benefits require commitment over a long time span that becomes more and more costly. Even a 10-year fiscal plan is not nearly enough to bring out the tradeoffs actually in play. The result of announcing a fiscal/monetary package like the optimal path and implementing the first few years
of its policies is likely to be bad if the private sector believes the commitment will be eventually abandoned. But these arguments and counterarguments are likely to be essential to policy formulation.

The paper’s discussion of the full-commitment case is mainly for the $G = .25, \gamma = .01$ case. I know that the qualitative results hold with $\gamma = .1$ or $G = 0$ or $G = .8$ instead. The initial inflation is smaller with $\gamma = .1$. It could of course be interesting to vary the utility function and the transactions technology. If the transactions technology made the Friedman rule feasible, would we mimic Calvo’s result? If the transactions technology made transactions costs a bounded function of $v$ (i.e. allowed a barter economy), would results change? The optimal path has time varying consumption growth, and thus a time varying real rate. How would that interact with production technology if we introduced capital? Could we solve a version of the model with limited commitment — say with a new policy maker every $T$ years, or with a constant hazard of a new policy maker taking over?

The paper’s model and our discussion of it leave plenty of open questions.

VIII. REAL WORLD COMPLICATIONS

Blanchard (2019), based on his Figure 15, argues that there is some evidence for a decline in the real return on capital, measured as the rate of profit relative to market capitalization. If there is such a decline, we could interpret it in this paper’s model as a decline in $\theta$, the rate of labor-augmenting technological improvement. This would imply that the gap between the return on debt and private asset returns might have been declining despite the stable rate of inflation, and therefore that the economy has been moving toward less reliance on seigniorage finance. This does not in itself, of course, imply that returning to previous levels of seigniorage would be optimal.

This paper uses a representative agent model, and therefore cannot consider intergenerational tax-shifting or “crowding out” issues. Blanchard and Mehrotra/Sergeyev instead assume away tax distortions in order to focus on intergenerational issues. Both aspects of debt finance are important, and should be considered jointly. Furthermore, liquidity premia on government debt vary somewhat across the term structure and across time, and currency, bearing no interest, does exist. A more serious quantitative evaluation of the effects of debt finance should consider all of these potentially important factors as operating jointly.

REFERENCES


5The rate was in the 6-8% range in the 1960’s in the US, and has been in the same range since 2001. There is some apparent downward trend, but it is not strong or uniform.
APPENDIX A. THE STEADY STATE SOLUTION AND ITS UNIQUENESS

We are assuming $\tau$ constant, $b > 0$, $C > 0$, $v > 0$. The Lagrange multiplier on the agent’s budget constraint is negative if $\tau > 1$, so this is ruled out by the agent’s optimization. (There is no reason to work if the after-tax wage is negative.) Negative $\tau$ is in principle possible (if seigniorage is used to generate revenue that finances a labor subsidy). With $\dot{t} = 0$ and $\dot{b} = 0$, the system of five equations, (4), (7), (8), (15) and (16) introduced on page 8 can be solved recursively to deliver the single quadratic equation in $v$,

$$\gamma v^2 (1 + \tau - 2G) + (\tau - G)v - \beta = 0. \quad (22)$$

Its roots are

$$v = \frac{G - \tau \pm \sqrt{(G - \tau)^2 + 4\beta \gamma (1 + \tau - 2G)}}{2\gamma \cdot (1 + \tau - 2G)}. \quad (23)$$

If $\tau > 2G - 1$, the equation has two real roots, one positive and one negative. Since negative $v$ makes no sense in the model, the positive root is the relevant one. If $\tau < 2G - 1$, the roots could be imaginary, in which case they correspond to no equilibrium of the model, or they can be real and of the same sign. For the two roots to be positive, we must have $G < \tau$. But $G < \tau$ and $\tau < 2G - 1$ jointly imply $\tau > 1$, which we have noted is impossible. So the only case that delivers an equilibrium with positive $v$ is $\tau > 2G - 1$, and in that case the steady state is unique. Note that for $G < .5$, any $\tau$ between zero and one is feasible, but as $G \to 1$, $\tau \to 1$ also for feasibility. Note that $G > 1$ is impossible in steady state.
APPENDIX B. IS THE STEADY STATE THE ONLY EQUILIBRIUM WITH CONSTANT \( \tau \)?

The previous section shows there is only one steady state, for any \( \tau \) for which a steady state exists. But could there be non-steady-state equilibria with \( \tau \) constant? To check this, we allow for non-zero \( \dot{b} \) in the government budget constraint (7). The other equations in the system remain unchanged from the previous section. Our derivation of the previous equation (22) can be repeated to result in

\[
-\frac{\dot{b}}{b} = \gamma v^2 (1 + \tau - 2G) + (\tau - G)v - \beta = 0. \tag{24}
\]

Since

\[
b = \frac{c}{b} = \frac{1 - \tau}{v \cdot (1 + 2\gamma v)}, \tag{25}
\]

\( b \) is monotonically decreasing in \( v \), going to zero as \( v \) goes to infinity and to infinity as \( v \) goes to zero.

**Proposition.** Equilibria with constant \( \tau \) in which \( b \to \infty \) are impossible.

**Proof.** For an individual agent, taking the path of prices, taxes, and interest rates as given, the only state variable is \( b \), real wealth. In any equilibrium, (4) tells us that \( C < 1 \) at all times, so discounted utility is bounded above. Suppose there is an equilibrium with \( b \to \infty \). It can deliver no greater discounted utility than that provided by the (infeasible) allocation of \( C \equiv 1, L \equiv 0 \), which is finite. If \( b \to \infty \) and therefore \( v \to 0 \), \( C \) converges to a positive constant, and the real rate of return on debt, \( \beta - \gamma v^2 \), converges to \( \beta \). But if \( b \) gets large enough, consuming \( \beta b \) forever, while setting \( L = 0 \), will appear to the competitive private agent to be feasible and to deliver a higher utility than any allocation that is actually feasible for the whole economy, so an equilibrium with \( b \to \infty \) does not exist. \( \square \)

**Proposition.** When there is a constant-tax equilibrium with \( b \) constant at \( \bar{b} \), there are no equilibria with \( b > \bar{b} \).

**Proof.** The right-hand side of (24) goes to \( -\beta \) as \( v \to 0 \), which implies that for large enough \( b, \dot{b} > 0 \). Continuity of that right-hand side, plus our result in appendix A that a constant-tax steady state, when it exists, is unique, implies that when a steady state exists, on any equilibrium path with \( b > \bar{b} \), \( b \to \infty \), which is impossible, so when a steady state exists, there are no equilibria with \( b > \bar{b} \). \( \square \)

**Proposition.** When there is no steady state with the constant tax rate \( \tau \), there are also no equilibria with \( \dot{b} > 0 \) anywhere along the entire equilibrium time path.

**Proof.** The fact that \( \dot{b} \) is positive for large enough values of \( b \) implies, with no steady state, that \( \dot{b} \) is positive everywhere and thus (since there is no steady state) that \( b \to \infty \), again contradicting the hypothesis that this was an equilibrium. \( \square \)
Now we consider possible equilibria with constant tax rate and decreasing $b$. So long as $G > 0$, the reasoning here is like that in most models with “active” fiscal policy. The positive $G$ requires an $L$ at least as large, so there is a lower bound on tax revenue from a fixed rate $\tau$. This implies that paths on which $b$ shrinks eventually require $b < 0$. In other words, private agents would see themselves, along these paths, as having insufficient wealth to finance their consumption path, ruling these paths out as equilibria.

To see how this works out in this model, and to allow consideration of the $G = 0$ case, we again rewrite the $\dot{b}$ equation, multiplying (24) through by $b$ and expressing everything on the right as a function of $v$:

$$\dot{b} = (1 - \tau) \left( \frac{\gamma v(1 + \tau - 2G)}{1 + 2\gamma v} + \frac{\tau - G}{1 + 2\gamma v} - \frac{\beta}{v \cdot (1 + 2\gamma v)} \right). \quad (26)$$

**Proposition.** When $\tau$ is constant, there are no equilibria with $b \rightarrow 0$.

**Proof.** As $v$ goes to infinity (and $b$ to zero), the right-hand side of this expression converges to $(1 - \tau)(1 + \tau - 2G)/2$, a positive number if a steady state exists, implying $b$ becomes negative and is bounded away from zero when $b$ becomes small. But this implies that $b$ reaches zero in finite time and then becomes negative. Thus a path with $b$ converging to zero cannot be an equilibrium. But we know that constant-tax steady state equilibria, when they exist, are unique, and also that $\dot{b}$ is negative for small enough $b$. This implies $\dot{b}$ is negative for $b < \bar{b}$ when the constant-tax steady state exists, and thus that there is no equilibrium with constant $\tau$ and $b < \bar{b}$.

When there is no steady state, i.e. $\tau + 1 < 2G$, the right-hand-side of (26) is negative, and therefore $\dot{b}$ is positive, for large enough $v$ (small enough $b$). Since the right-hand-side of (26) is continuous, and there is no steady state, This means $\dot{b}$ must be positive for all values of $b$ on any equilibrium path, and therefore that there are no equilibria with constant $\tau$ and $b$ decreasing. \(\square\)

This completes the argument that when $\tau$ is constant, the only competitive equilibria that exist are steady states, and that the steady state for a given constant $\tau$ is unique.

**APPENDIX C. UNIQUENESS OF THE INITIAL PRICE LEVEL**

The nominal government budget constraint is

$$\dot{B} = iB + GP - \tau LP. \quad (27)$$

If this holds at every moment, including the initial date, it implies that $B_0$ is fixed and cannot be affected by policy choices. But we know that a fixed-$\tau$ equilibrium exists, and that it implies a value of $b = B/P$ that does not depend on $B$. Thus our analysis implies that at time zero, the price level jumps up or down to match $B/P$ to
the equilibrium value of $b$. Since the equilibrium, when it exists, is unique, the initial price level is uniquely determined.

In our discussion of policy implications in the main text, we considered the possibility of an instantaneous upward jump in $B$. It does seem plausible that a large upward jump in $B$ could be produced by a brief and very large transfer payment. This would involve mailing checks to the public — which was actually done during the pandemic. Such an action, if followed by a constant $\tau$ and $G$, would affect only the initial price level, not the subsequent real equilibrium path.

The reverse policy action, a discrete downward jump in $B_0$, seems less plausible. Lump sum transfers are much easier to arrange than large lump-sum taxes or wealth confiscations. In our simple representative agent model, a one-time lump-sum tax, paid for by agents selling nominal bonds, might seem possible. But with heterogeneous holdings of bonds, a uniform lump sum tax might not even be feasible because of the wealth differences, while a uniform lump sum transfer would not face such a problem.

Department of Economics, Princeton University

Email address: sims@princeton.edu